Governance

Proof of One: one-person-one-identity polling with encrypted ballots — design and reference code, requesting critical review

Read full article at source ↗

Based on a feed excerpt; full article content has not been acquired. Source evidence retrieved 27/10/2026, 07:58:25 UTC.

Briefings

Nemo Unus, a pseudonymous maintainer, released Proof of One, an open-source design for polls with one-person-one-identity. The system uses NFC to read ICAO 9303 passport chips, verifies signatures via a public tree without revealing document details, and matches live faces to chip photos in an attested enclave. A Groth16 proof covers membership, eligibility, and ballot well-formedness, with a 7-day challenge window before key deletion. The design aims to prevent operators from linking answers to voters while allowing public result recounting.

Key points

• The system uses NFC to read ICAO 9303 passport chips and verifies signatures via a public tree without revealing document details.
• A Groth16 proof covers membership, eligibility, and ballot well-formedness, with a 7-day challenge window before key deletion.

Context

Proof of One is designed to solve the ballot side of verifiable voting by ensuring every participant is a unique human and nobody can link answers to people. It builds on existing work like DAVINCI and MACI but focuses on a census of unique humans built from chip documents rather than a supplied voter list.

Limitations

The design is in draft stage and has not been audited by independent humans. The reference circuit has 577,678 constraints, and proof-of-personhood systems are not yet fully tested in field conditions. Some trust list references are limited to 113 of 186 chip-passport countries.

Generated by Bittrees-hosted qwen35-2b sha256:aaf42c8b7c3c on 27/10/2026, 08:00:23 UTC. Based on publisher-provided feed evidence; may not cover the full original article. Check the source for details.

View archived briefing on IPFS
bafybeiam2th23se2pnslg4e3libk73p2i27u7iw7or4hugkz7lg4mgpvfa