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Reveal optionality in encrypted mempools: how big is the sender’s free option, and a post-quantum way to remove it

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Based on a feed excerpt; full article content has not been acquired. Source evidence retrieved 22/10/2026, 05:13:26 UTC.

Briefings

The evidence reveals that senders in encrypted mempools hold a 'free option' whose value is bounded by a Jensen gap, estimated at 1 bit per block under current conditions. The paper proposes Blind Simultaneous Release (BSR) as a post-quantum solution using only hashes to eliminate this optionality. While LUCID fees currently price the option poorly due to multi-commitment attacks, BSR shifts the burden to committee members. Key findings include a theoretical coalition size of at least n/2 for blocking and a fee requirement of at least 25 bp to deter attacks, though hardware speed assumptions remain unverified.

Key points

• The 'free option' in encrypted mempools is a Jensen gap bounded by 1 bit per block under ETH implied volatility of 51% and an 8-second window.
• Blind Simultaneous Release (BSR) eliminates the optionality by requiring senders to post escrows with long sequential hash chains before revealing values.

Context

This research addresses the 'free option' problem in LUCID (EIP-8184) where senders can conditionally withhold transaction values. The study proposes BSR as a post-quantum alternative using only hashes, with formal proofs in Lean 4 and a GitHub repository for the Lean 4 formalization and numerics.

Limitations

The analysis relies on theoretical assumptions about sequential-hash ASIC speedups rather than measured hardware data. The coalition size for blocking is derived from committee model assumptions and not empirically verified in deployed designs. The hardware gap remains unanalyzed, and the bisection dispute game for inconsistent escrows has not been fully analyzed.

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