Governance

A privacy pool on frame transactions: what works, and the case that does not yet

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Based on a feed excerpt; full article content has not been acquired. Source evidence retrieved 10/11/2026, 15:13:26 UTC.

Briefings

A privacy pool on frame transactions successfully pays its own gas on Nethermind master, allowing withdrawals to bypass relayers. However, two critical limitations prevent universal adoption: the proof check exceeds the validation gas cap, and a pool cannot pay for a call originating from the user's own address. Measurements show a 233,000 gas budget fits under current node limits, but a 300,000 budget would accommodate one attacker peer at 50ms. The protocol requires a spec change to scope nonce keys to the payer address.

Key points

• A private withdrawal costs 679,322 gas on Nethermind master, where the pool sender pays its own gas without a relayer.
• The proof check for the withdrawal exceeds the EIP-8141 validation gas cap of 233,000 execution gas, causing the transaction to fail on some nodes.

Context

This article details a real-world test of a shielded privacy pool on the Ethereum frame network using Nethermind. The study measures gas costs and validates the protocol's ability to pay for its own operations, revealing specific technical constraints regarding gas caps and address-based nonce key management.

Limitations

Measurements were conducted on two specific local builder machines (AMD EPYC 4344P and 9645 host) and cannot determine if code changes or hardware differences caused failures. The protocol requires a pending spec update to scope nonce keys to the payer address, which is not yet implemented in the current version.

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