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Reveal optionality in encrypted mempools: how big is the sender’s free option, and a post-quantum way to remove it
Publication: Ethereum Research - Latest topics
Author: arianaraghi
Source published: 22/10/2026, 05:07:16 UTC
Briefing created: 02/11/2026, 01:22:53 UTC
Based on a feed excerpt; full article content has not been acquired. Source evidence retrieved 28/10/2026, 16:58:27 UTC.
Briefings
A research paper proposes Blind Simultaneous Release (BSR) as a post-quantum mechanism to eliminate the 'free option' in Ethereum's encrypted mempools. The study bounds the value of this option, showing it is bounded by a Jensen gap dependent on market volatility. It demonstrates that BSR fixes the executed set before new information can condition on it, using only hashes for security. The paper formalizes these concepts in Lean 4 with 116 theorems and provides a Lean 4 formalization and numerics for 'Reveal Optionality in Encrypted Mempools'.
Key points
- The 'free option' in encrypted mempools is bounded by a Jensen gap equal to the difference between what a sender controls and what the market gives for free, which is strictly positive under simple criteria.
- Blind Simultaneous Release (BSR) fixes the executed set before any new information can condition on it, using only hashes to ensure post-quantum security without pairings or discrete-log assumptions.
Context
This work builds on LUCID and a ticket-first threshold IBE design, addressing how much the 'free option' in encrypted mempools is worth and what happens if it is removed. The findings are critical for understanding fee mechanisms and preventing frontrunning in Ethereum's mempool architecture.
Limitations
The analysis assumes a simple criterion for the option's value and relies on ETH implied volatility around 51% with an 8-second window. The paper's timing numbers are corrected for ePBS bid commitment, and the time-lock ceiling is approximately 2, meaning forced opening requires committee shares rather than transactions.
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