Tech
How should armies fight?
Publication: The Works in Progress Newsletter
Author: Pieter Garicano
Source published: 17/11/2026, 14:59:30 UTC
Briefing created: 17/11/2026, 15:30:29 UTC
Based on a feed excerpt; full article content has not been acquired. Source evidence retrieved 17/11/2026, 15:16:25 UTC.
Briefings
A column from the Works in Progress extended universe analyzes how modern warfare is shifting from large-scale concentration to sensor-based defense, citing Ukrainian military adaptations. Heinz Guderian's 1937 doctrine of armored concentration is contrasted with modern realities where sensors and precision munitions make traditional offensive maneuvers impossible. The article highlights the Ukrainian experience in Ukraine, where soldiers retreat to cities and underground shelters to avoid detection, while Russian forces face significant attrition due to inability to achieve surprise or concentration. Key figures include Heinz Guderian (1937) and Jack Watling (2023), with the Ukrainian Third Assault Brigade noted as adapting to these new conditions.
Key points
- Heinz Guderian argued in 1937 that tanks should concentrate in armored formations controlled by radio to break through enemy lines, a doctrine that has become obsolete due to modern sensors.
- Jack Watling's 2023 book The Arms of the Future identifies three defining forces of modern war: sensor reach, weapon range, and munition precision, which have made traditional concentration tactics impossible.
Context
The article contrasts historical armored doctrines with modern realities, using the Ukrainian war in Ukraine as a primary case study where soldiers retreat to cities and underground shelters to avoid detection. It highlights the shift from offensive concentration to defensive dispersion as the primary strategic adaptation.
Limitations
Evidence is limited to a single column from the Works in Progress extended universe. The article does not provide specific casualty numbers, troop movements, or dates for the Ukrainian adaptations beyond the general timeframe of the war. The analysis relies on Watling's 2023 book and Guderian's 1937 text, with no independent verification of the Ukrainian tactical shifts.
Generated by Bittrees-hosted qwen35-2b sha256:aaf42c8b7c3c on 17/11/2026, 15:30:29 UTC. Based on publisher-provided feed evidence; may not cover the full original article. Check the source for details.
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