Quantum
The Entire Quantum Computer on a Classical Leash
Publication: quant-ph updates on arXiv.org
Author: Yael Tauman Kalai, Dakshita Khurana, Justin Raizes
Source published: 26/10/2026, 04:00:00 UTC
Briefing created: 26/10/2026, 05:48:01 UTC
Based on a feed excerpt; full article content has not been acquired. Source evidence retrieved 26/10/2026, 04:13:24 UTC.
Briefings
A classical client can securely run quantum computations using a malicious quantum server without trusting it, enabling private quantum state preparation and persistent quantum memory. This resolves two open problems in quantum cryptography by providing a general-purpose protocol based on post-quantum LWE hardness.
Key points
- A classical client can privately choose and run quantum computations using a single untrusted quantum server as its own trusted quantum computer.
- The protocol resolves two open problems: classical verification of quantum sampling with negligible computational soundness error, and remote state preparation of efficiently preparable quantum states.
Context
This finding allows purely classical parties to act as quantum parties in interactive protocols, resolving two known open problems in quantum cryptography through a general-purpose maliciously secure two-party computation protocol.
Limitations
The evidence is a preprint from arXiv, and the authors expect the virtual quantum computer to be broadly useful but do not provide specific application details or performance metrics.
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