Governance
PQ spending for Stealth Address Protocol
Publication: Ethereum Research - Latest topics
Author: namnc
Source published: 28/09/2026, 01:09:06 UTC
Briefing created: 28/09/2026, 01:47:43 UTC
Based on a feed excerpt; full article content has not been acquired. Source evidence retrieved 28/09/2026, 01:28:26 UTC.
Briefings
The provided evidence outlines a technical proposal for upgrading the Stealth Address Protocol (SAP) to post-quantum security standards. The authors propose replacing the current ECDSA signature scheme with a new PQ ML-DSA scheme (Scheme ID 6) to protect both payment discovery and recipient unlinkability against quantum attackers. The process involves registering a Stealth Meta Address, deriving ephemeral signing keys for one-time payments, and using a scanning service to verify spending without exposing the funds. The evidence explicitly notes that Isogeny is being considered but rejected due to security concerns and lack of NIST standardization, while ML-DSA variants are proposed as the primary path forward.
Key points
- The proposed upgrade replaces the current ECDSA signature scheme with a new PQ ML-DSA scheme (Scheme ID 6) to protect payment discovery and recipient unlinkability against quantum attackers.
- The evidence explicitly rejects Isogeny as a primary upgrade path due to questionable security status and lack of NIST standardization, favoring ML-DSA variants instead.
Context and limitations
The evidence is limited to a technical proposal and mechanism description. It does not contain specific implementation details, gas cost estimates, or deployment timelines. The authors explicitly state that the numbers (gas cost) in the post are likely to change in the future and focus on mechanism rather than actual costs. The evidence also notes that the current property of unlinkable sender anonymity is not guaranteed.
Generated by Bittrees-hosted qwen35-2b sha256:aaf42c8b7c3c on 28/09/2026, 01:47:43 UTC. Based on publisher-provided feed evidence; may not cover the full original article. Check the source for details.
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