Quantum

SEALSQ Presents Research on Side-Channel Attacks Against ML-KEM

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Based on a feed excerpt; full article content has not been acquired. Source evidence retrieved 14/10/2026, 12:20:28 UTC.

Briefings

SEALSQ presented peer-reviewed research at LightSec 2026 detailing a side-channel attack on the encoding step of ML-KEM using profiling and lattice reduction. The study identifies implementation risks in NIST-standardized post-quantum cryptography and proposes countermeasures. The research complements SEALSQ's hardware security efforts, including the QS7001 secure element undergoing Common Criteria EAL5+ certification.

Key points

• A novel hybrid attack combining profiling-based techniques with lattice reduction was developed to recover sensitive information from side-channel leakage during ML-KEM encoding.
• The research highlights implementation risks in NIST-standardized post-quantum cryptography and proposes practical countermeasures to improve ML-KEM robustness against physical attacks.

Context and limitations

The study focuses on the encoding step of ML-KEM under realistic conditions. Specific implementation details of the countermeasures remain unverified, and the effectiveness of the attack against specific hardware implementations is not confirmed.

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