TBNQuantum
NowSecure Finds No Detectable PQC Code in 97% of Mobile Apps
Publication: The Quantum Insider
Author: Mohib Ur Rehman
Source published: 20/10/2026, 13:25:26 UTC
Briefing created: 20/10/2026, 14:35:17 UTC
Based on a feed excerpt; full article content has not been acquired. Source evidence retrieved 20/10/2026, 14:04:25 UTC.
Briefings
A NowSecure analysis of 136,711 mobile apps found 96.9% contained no detectable post-quantum cryptography (PQC) code, with over 3,100 apps exhibiting weak encryption algorithms like DES and RC4. The report highlights that mobile apps are the most exposed and least inventoried part of an organization's encryption, creating a critical gap between current security practices and the need for quantum-safe migration. While Gartner warns that quantum capabilities threaten public-key cryptography by 2029, the immediate risk lies in legacy algorithms and the lack of inventory for mobile applications, which must be remediated before future quantum threats emerge.
Key points
- NowSecure analyzed 136,711 iOS and Android apps, finding 96.9% contained no detectable post-quantum cryptography (PQC) code.
- Over 3,100 mobile apps were flagged for weak encryption algorithms, including legacy DES and RC4, alongside the absence of PQC code.
Context
Mobile apps are the most exposed and least inventoried part of an organization's encryption, creating a critical gap between current security practices and the need for quantum-safe migration. Organizations often lack visibility into apps handling sensitive data, leaving them vulnerable to future quantum attacks.
Limitations
The analysis covers only 136,711 iOS and Android apps as of October 2026. Findings regarding weak encryption algorithms are based on runtime testing and may not reflect all mobile applications. The report does not provide data on the specific impact of quantum computer availability on mobile apps or the exact timeline for federal agency readiness.
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