Security
New Attack Against RSA
Publication: Schneier on Security
Author: Bruce Schneier
Source published: 28/09/2026, 11:02:58 UTC
Briefing created: 28/09/2026, 11:15:57 UTC
Based on a feed excerpt; full article content has not been acquired. Source evidence retrieved 28/09/2026, 11:15:24 UTC.
Briefings
ArsTechnica reports a 2007 research paper updated for 2026 on a forgery attack against RSA signatures. The attack bypasses factoring and allows attackers to forge digital signatures without recovering private keys. It targets pure signatures without padding, requiring subexponential time but significantly faster than factoring. The authors successfully forged messages for 1024-bit RSA using 1380 CPU core-years over five months.
Key points
- The attack is a forgery attack that allows attackers to forge digital signatures without recovering the private key from the public key.
- The attack targets pure RSA signatures without formatting or padding, requiring subexponential time but faster than factoring.
Context and limitations
The evidence is from a 2007 research paper, and the article notes the authors have a webpage with better context. The attack is limited to signatures without padding, and the speed is relative to factoring algorithms.
Generated by Bittrees-hosted qwen35-2b sha256:aaf42c8b7c3c on 28/09/2026, 11:15:57 UTC. Based on publisher-provided feed evidence; may not cover the full original article. Check the source for details.
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