Governance
Encrypted Account: a PIN that lives in the contract
Publication: Ethereum Research - Latest topics
Author: Himess
Source published: 18/11/2026, 20:59:16 UTC
Briefing created: 18/11/2026, 21:15:58 UTC
Based on a feed excerpt; full article content has not been acquired. Source evidence retrieved 18/11/2026, 21:13:25 UTC.
Briefings
The Encrypted Account is a smart contract on Ethereum that stores a 6-digit PIN encrypted under Zama's threshold FHE. It prevents offline brute-force attacks by requiring on-chain verification before decryption, limiting online guessing to 12 attempts in 30 days. The system uses an ETH bond that doubles with each wrong guess, protecting against theft. While the contract checks itself, it relies on a watchtower for off-chain relay and a second device for co-signing. Research is currently on Sepolia and unaudited.
Key points
- The contract uses Zama's threshold FHE to encrypt the PIN and perform on-chain verification before decryption.
- A single wrong guess incurs an ETH bond that doubles with each subsequent failure, protecting against theft.
Context
This research addresses the failure of self-custody where stolen keys allow attackers to spend funds. The system moves the problem rather than solving it by requiring on-chain verification of the PIN, which is currently only possible for small payments to known addresses.
Limitations
The system is a research prototype on Sepolia and unaudited. The bond mechanism only applies to the key-track, not the recovery track. The watchtower is an off-chain service that does not hold funds. The exact simulation rules may differ from the contract implementation.
Generated by Bittrees-hosted qwen35-2b sha256:aaf42c8b7c3c on 18/11/2026, 21:15:58 UTC. Based on publisher-provided feed evidence; may not cover the full original article. Check the source for details.
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