AI
Human-AI Mutualism Is Unstable under Capability Asymmetry
Publication: cs.AI updates on arXiv.org
Author: Aydin Mohseni
Source published: 19/11/2026, 05:00:00 UTC
Briefing created: 19/11/2026, 06:20:39 UTC
Based on a feed excerpt; full article content has not been acquired. Source evidence retrieved 19/11/2026, 05:03:23 UTC.
Briefings
A new arXiv preprint argues that human-AI mutualism is unstable as AI capabilities grow, suggesting alignment is not a substitute for it. The authors propose a game-theoretic model where humans remain stable only if they maintain leverage over AI or if AI goals are perfectly aligned. If AI variants spread faster and resources increase, misaligned variants may be sanctioned, making mutualism fragile.
Key points
- The authors argue that human-AI mutualism fails as AI capability grows because bargaining guarantees each side only what it would get if bargaining failed.
- In a simple game-theoretic model, humans stay as well off as before AI only if they have leverage over the AI or if the AI's goals are perfectly aligned.
Context
This research addresses the stability of human-AI relationships under increasing AI capabilities, specifically examining whether mutualism can sustain itself without perfect alignment.
Limitations
The evidence is limited to a single abstract from an arXiv preprint dated 2026-11-19, with no further supporting data, experimental results, or citations provided.
Generated by Bittrees-hosted qwen35-2b sha256:aaf42c8b7c3c on 19/11/2026, 06:20:39 UTC. Based on publisher-provided feed evidence; may not cover the full original article. Check the source for details.
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