Governance

Post-quantum signatureless authorization with recursive verification

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Based on a feed excerpt; full article content has not been acquired. Source evidence retrieved 30/10/2026, 15:43:26 UTC.

Briefings

A 2026 paper introduces post-quantum signatureless authorization using recursive verification and zero-knowledge proofs. The system uses a fixed public circuit to establish authority via a reusable secret commitment, with each action authorized by a fresh zero-knowledge proof. The central finding is the establishment of recursive verification bindings, allowing a block prover to update execution witnesses while maintaining the same authorization capsule. The paper provides a quantum chosen-request security reduction and numerical certificates for the masking ranks and extraction error, with a total forgery probability bounded below 2^-41 for authorization attempts.

Key points

• The system uses a fixed public circuit to establish authority via a reusable secret commitment, with each action authorized by a fresh zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.
• Recursive verification allows a block prover to update execution witnesses while maintaining the same authorization capsule, enforced by exact binary-field arithmetic and canonical statement bindings.

Context

Digital signatures traditionally rely on factoring or discrete logarithms, which are threatened by Shor's quantum algorithm. This post-quantum transition requires replacing the mechanism of authority establishment itself. The paper proposes a signatureless approach using zero-knowledge proofs to prove execution, addressing the safe reuse problem where adversaries could collect valid proofs and adapt later requests.

Limitations

The evidence is limited to the paper's theoretical construction and numerical certificates. The paper is a preprint with unverified security claims. The extraction error is bounded but not explicitly quantified for all failure modes. The security reduction assumes a specific quantum model and ideal-slice setup not fully validated in the full implementation.

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